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Abstract
We consider an economy where most of the health care is publicly provided,
and where there is waiting time for several types of treatments. Private
health care without waiting time is an option for the patients in the public
health queue. We show that although patients with low waiting costs will
choose public treatment, they may be better off with waiting time than
without. The reason is that waiting time induces patients with high waiting
costs to choose private treatment, thus reducing the cost of public health
care that everyone pays for. Even if higher quality (i.e. zero waiting time) can
be achieved at no cost, the self-selection induced redistribution may imply
that it is socially optimal to provide health care publicly and at an inferior
quality level. We give a detailed discussion of the circumstances in which it is
optimal to have waiting time for public health treatment. Moreover, we study
the interaction between this quality decision and the optimal tax/subsidy on
private health care.
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In several countries with dominantly public health care, there are often queues for some types of
treatments. Waiting time in the public health system is often explained by some referral to limited
public resources. It is however not clear why a system with a queue should cost less than a
system without. One obvious explanation is that demand for most types of health services
fluctuates over time. If one were to dimension the capacity of the health system such that there
never was any waiting time, there would be periods of idle capacity.
1 This would be more costly
than a system in which there always was full capacity utilization, and with a waiting time during
periods of high demand
2. However, if this were the only reason for having waiting time, one
would expect the waiting time to fluctuate between something close to zero and to, say, a month
or two. The waiting times observed for many types of treatments are however considerably
larger. More importantly, although they fluctuate, they are always bounded well away from zero.
For instance, in England there were almost 2 million patients waiting for outpatient services, and
more than 1 million patients registered for ordinary (inpatient) or day case admissions in the
National Health Service in September 1999. Of the latter, 49% had been waiting for 3 months or
more, and 26% had been waiting for more than 6 months. Similarly, in Norway the average
waiting time for non-prioritized patients varied from about 3 months (outpatients) to about 4
months (day case and inpatients).
 3 Clearly, cost savings due to better capacity utilization cannot
explain waiting times of this length.
One way aggregate costs could be held down through queues is to let the treatment per unit of
time be lower than the flow of new cases per unit of time. If all new cases were added to the
queue, this would make waiting times increase without any limit. Although e.g. NHS waiting lists
have grown over time, they have not grown as such rates. The reason we do not see such rapid
growth in waiting times is that the queue itself has an effect on how the flow of cases translates
into a flow demand for treatment in the public sector. One possibility is that the queue causes
some people to exit from the queue before being treated.
                                                
1 Worthington (1987) gives an analysis of waiting time that is caused by stochastic demand for health services.
2 Mobley and Magnussen (1998) present the need for excess capacity to ensure availability in private sector as an
explanation of why they found no support to the hypothesis that private American hospitals in an competitive
environment are more efficient than Norwegian public hospitals.
3 See Department of Health, UK (1999) and Norwegian Patient Register (1999). A further discussion of waiting lists
in England and Norway is given in Appendix D of Hoel and Sæther (2000).3
The most drastic form of exit would be that patients die while waiting for treatment. Even though
there are surveys confirming such deaths
4, the longest queues typically are for medical cases that
are not life threatening. A more positive possibility is that the illness heals on its own while
waiting for treatment. To the extent that this occurs, the patient’s cost of the queue is the
postponement in recovery. A related possibility is that after experiencing a particular health
defect for some time, a patient finds it less unpleasant than they initially find it. If medical
treatment (e.g. an operation) has some risk of actually making the condition worse, this may
imply that after a period of waiting the patient prefers to exit from the queue and accept the
health defect. An alternative explanation is given by Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984): They
assume that waiting time induces some people to never join the queue for treatment, due to the
existence of costs incurred at the time one joins the queue. When this is the case, it can be better
to never receive treatment than to receive treatment after a waiting period.
Several of the possibilities above probably are relevant explanations of how the existence of a
queue might reduce the flow demand for health treatment in the public sector. We shall ignore all
of these possibilities in the present paper, and instead focus on what perhaps is a more important
effect of waiting time in the public sector. Patients who enter into such a queue for medical
treatment sometimes have the option of using a private alternative to the public health care, thus
avoiding the queue (see e.g. Cullis and Jones (1985), Iversen (1997)). However, by doing this
they often incur larger costs, as they have to pay for the private treatment (directly or through a
private supplementary insurance they previously have purchased), while the treatment in the
public system would have been free or almost free. The longer the waiting time, the more people
choose the private alternative. The waiting time is thus an equilibrating mechanism making the
demand for public treatment equal the supply, which is politically determined.
In Section 2 we set up a model describing the choice between treatment in the public and private
sector. In Section 3 we use this model to discuss health queues within a framework of standard
                                                
4 Plump et al. (1999) examined the circumstances of death regarding patients who died in 1994 and 1995 while on
waiting list for cardiac surgery in the Netherlands. They found that waiting lists for cardiac surgery engender high
risks for the patients involved and approximately 100 deaths per year in this patient group was waiting list related. At
least half of the deaths occur within the first six weeks.4
welfare theory. In particular, we wish to see what type of considerations might make waiting time
for treatment in the public sector part of a welfare maximizing policy.
An important result in our analysis is that if distributional objectives are sufficiently strong, it
may be optimal to have waiting time for public treatment. This result has some similarities to the
literature on public provision of private goods. An important contribution to this literature is
Besley and Coate (1991). They present a model in which the quantity demanded for a good is
given (as in our model), but that if privately purchased, there is a choice of quality. They show
that if sufficient weight is given to equity, welfare can be improved if this good of a particular
quality is offered for free by the public sector, financed through a head tax. The favorable
distributional effect is caused by the high-income persons choosing to buy the good privately, in
a higher quality version, instead of accepting the publicly offered version of the good. Just like in
our model, there is thus a self-selection mechanism that gives the desired result. Similar results
focusing on the self-selection mechanism have been given by Blackorby and Donaldson (1988),
Boadway and Marchand (1995) and Blomquist and Christiansen (1995). The two latter articles
also demonstrate that there is a role for publicly provided private goods even if an optimal non-
linear tax is available for redistribution.
Our model has some similarities to the models used in the literature above. In our model the
quality dimension of the good is waiting time for public treatment. However, unlike the models
above, there is no reduction in production costs associated with a reduction in the quality level
from the best (no waiting time) to an inferior quality level (positive waiting time). We show that
even when higher quality can be achieved at no cost, the self-selection induced redistribution may
imply that it is socially optimal to provide the good publicly and at an inferior quality level.
Unlike most of the literature discussed above, we give a relatively detailed discussion of the
circumstances in which it is optimal to have an inferior quality of the publicly provided good (i.e.
waiting time for public health treatment). Moreover, we study the interaction between this quality
decision and the optimal tax/subsidy on the privately supplied version of the good.5
An important issue in a system with predominantly public health care is how the government
should treat alternative private treatment. It has been argued that a private alternative may
undermine the public system, so that the government ought to discourage any private alternative.
The most drastic form of “discouragement” would be to forbid various types of private treatment.
Norway can serve as an interesting example, where the private-for-profit health care providers
face a prohibitive tax in the form of legal regulation prohibiting new inpatient facilities (some
beds were accepted before the law came into practice in 1986).
5   A less drastic form of
discouragement would be to impose a tax on private treatment. One could however also argue
that those who choose the private alternative should be subsidized by the public health insurance.
One argument for such subsidization is that in a public system, everyone has paid his or her
mandatory insurance premium. Therefore, everyone should be entitled to compensation if they
become ill. In particular, a person choosing the private system should be entitled to whatever it
would have cost to treat this person in the public system.
The argument above for subsidizing private health care was based on fairness. However, even
disregarding the issue of fairness, one could make an argument for such subsidization. By
subsidizing the private alternative, the cost of this alternative will be lowered. Therefore more
people will choose this alternative. If the subsidy is sufficiently below the cost of treatment in the
public sector, there may be a net cost saving for the public sector. This cost saving could be used
to expand the treatment capacity in the public health care system, and thus reduce queues for
those who don’t choose the private alternative. In other words, even if we give no weight to the
interests of those who choose to use the private alternative, it might be sensible to partially
subsidize treatment in the private sector. This reason for subsidizing private treatment is briefly
discussed in Cullis and Jones (1985).
                                                
5 However, the policy in Norway is not very consistent: The local governments and the National Insurance scheme
are the key purchasers of private services to reduce the public waiting lists. During the last years there have been
several initiatives to purchase privately provided services, also for inpatients.  The Norwegian National Insurance
scheme finances private health care services for employed on sick leave, restricted to those with a prognosis for a
rapid return to work.  Some counties in addition offer the whole population a choice between a free private or public
treatment. There are also municipalities that provide their community with a free private health insurance scheme.6
In Sections 4-6 we use our basic model to see what the optimal tax/subsidy of private sector
treatment is. Section 4 discusses the case when waiting time and the tax/subsidy are chosen
simultaneously without any further restictions. In Section 5, we add the restriction that the
capacity of the public health treatment is given. Finally, Section 6 considers the case where the
waiting time is given exogenously by mechanisms not explained by the model.
Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
2. A model of public and private health care
Consider the simple case in which an exogenously given (and non-stochastic) number of cases
requiring medical treatment of a particular type occur each year. Denote this number of cases by
x. Moreover, assume that in the public sector there is a waiting time T before treatment is
performed. Once treatment is given, it is free.
6 The unit cost of treatment is assumed to be
constant, denoted by q, in the public health system.
7
The private sector gives the same type of treatment, but without any waiting time, at a positive
price p. Obviously, if there were no costs associated with waiting for treatment, everyone would
prefer public to private treatment, since the former is free and the latter is not. There are,
however, costs associated with waiting for treatment. One such cost could be that the medical
condition deteriorates during the waiting time. The cost of this deterioration would either be a
more severe treatment once the patient gets it, and/or a worse condition after treatment than the
condition would have been after immediate treatment.
8 Another type of waiting cost is that
patients suffer a welfare loss during the waiting period. This welfare loss could be either outright
pain or various types of discomfort.
9 For instance, a person waiting for a knee operation would
                                                
6 In the end of this Section we demonstrate that in this model a fee for public treatment is equivalent to subsidizing
private treatment.
7 We thus completely ignore all issues related to the labour market for physicians. Iversen (1997), Brekke and
Sørgård (2000) and Marchand and Schroyen (2000) are among the few studies of these issues and their relationship
to the interaction between the public and private health sector.
8 In a study of patients admitted to hospital for elective orthopedic surgery in Norway, Rossvoll et.al. (1993) found
that the probability of returning to work after surgery is strongly influenced by the length of time on the waiting list.
A high proportion of the patients with a chronic orthopedic disorder were not able to work while waiting.
9 Hamilton et al. (1996) investigated the effect of waiting time for hip fracture surgery in Canada on post-surgery
length of stay in hospital and inpatient mortality. They found no evidence of a detrimental impact caused by pre-7
have to abstain from physical activities he/she otherwise would have undertaken. Another
example could be a couple that does not wish to have more children, so that one of the persons
wishes to be sterilized. During the waiting phase, the couple either must risk pregnancy or at least
one of the persons would have to bear the inconveniences of preventive measures.
10 Additional
health care cost may also be invoked in the form of care while waiting or the need for new tests
and diagnosis.
11 Patients that are not able to work while waiting for treatment normally face a
income loss. This loss is often (partially) compensated thrugh a sickness benefit scheme. This
incurs a cost for the society at large in the form of increased tax distortions to fund the benefit
schemes, in addition to the production loss of absenteeism
12.
Whatever the background for the waiting costs, we shall assume that they are proportional to the
waiting time.
13 The cost per unit of waiting time is assumed to vary among the population. We
would expect this variation to be correlated to income variations, as a higher income typically
will imply a higher willingness to pay to avoid waiting. However, waiting costs are also likely to
vary among individuals for other reasons: An active skier or runner is likely to have considerably
higher waiting costs for a knee operation than a person with a less active life style.
Denote the waiting cost per unit of waiting time for a particular person by θ , so that the total
waiting cost for this person is θ T. The distribution of waiting costs across the population is given
by the distribution function F(θ ). The lowest and highest values of θ  are α  and β , respectively, so
that F(α )=0 and F(β )=1.
                                                                                                                                                             
surgery delay, but that surgery delay may lead to greater pre-surgery inpatient costs and more patient discomfort.
Roy and Hunter (1996) studied 97 orthopaedic patients awaiting lower-limb surgery. 90 had pain, 44 significant
night pains. Psychological and social problems were common. Only 11 were employed full-time. 68 required help
with daily activities and 48 patients walked less than 120 metres in 12 minutes. The study also revealed that the
planned procedure was no longer appropriate for 12 of the 97 patients.
10 Using Norwegian data, Hørding et al. (1982) showed that the rate of abortions among women on waiting lists for
sterilization was 3.4 times the rate in the normal population.
11 Stern & Brown (1994) establish a significant relationship between failure to attend initial appointments and the
length of time between referral and appointments in a child and family clinic.
12 With a long waiting time the size of these costs may by far outnumber the direct medical expenses. Hagen and
Østtveiten (1999) report in an evaluation of a Norwegian project that uses sickness benefits to procure non-
complicated health services that the average medical expenses equals 14 days of sickness benefit payments.
13 Notice that this assumption implies that the analysis of waiting lists by e.g. Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) does
not apply to the present case, as a crucial assumption in their analysis is that there is a positive fixed cost of joining
the waiting list.8
From the assumptions above, it is straightforward to derive the demand for private treatment. A
person will choose private treatment if and only if the waiting cost for public treatment (θ T)
exceeds the price of private treatment (p). This gives the demand for private treatment, denoted
by y, as




π =− =  (1)
where π =p/T is the ratio between the private sector price and the public sector waiting time. If
this ratio is sufficiently low, everyone will choose private treatment, while if the ratio π  is
sufficiently high, no one will choose private treatment. Formally, it follows from (1) that
() yxf o r ππ α =≤     (2)
() 0 yf o r ππ β =≥     (3)
The most interesting case is the when α <π <β , implying 0<y<x.
Let the price of private treatment in the absence of a tax or subsidy be equal to mq. We assume
that the parameter m≥ 1, although this is not obvious. There are at least two reasons why we may
expect to find m>1. One reason is that the private sector is assumed to have no waiting time,
which implies that it must have a lower capacity utilization, since the need for treatment in reality
will fluctuate over time. The second reason for m>1 is that in a health system where the private
sector is only a supplement, there is reason to believe that competition will be less than perfect,
thus making the equilibrium price exceed the unit cost. On the other hand, the private sector
could be more efficient than the public sector. If this were true and the efficiency difference was
sufficiently large, this could outweigh the two factors mentioned above, so that the net result was
m<1. The reason why we nevertheless assume that m≥ 1 is that if m<1, the public sector could
purchase health services from the private sector instead of producing them. By doing this, the unit9
cost of publicly provided health services would be brought down to the price of privately
produced services, thus making m=1.
14
Assume that the public sector taxes or subsidizes treatment in the private sector at a rate t (i.e. t>0
is a tax and t<0 is a subsidy), so that the net price paid by users of the private system is p=mq+t.
The total costs for the public sector related to the medical care under consideration consists of
treatment costs plus the costs of subsidizing the private sector, or minus the revenue from taxing
the private sector. Denoting the total costs by C we thus have
(( ) ) ( ) Cq xy t y ππ =− −     (4)
Nothing is lost by normalizing units so x=1. With this normalization we may rewrite (4) as
() ( ) Cqqt y π =− +     (5)
The total expected costs of the health system for a person of type θ  consists of two terms. The
first term is this person’s contribution to the expenditures of the public system. Assume that that
total expenditures of the public health system are shared equally between everyone, so this first
term is equal to C/N where N is the size of the population.
15 The second term is the expected
costs of treatment should the person become ill. The probability of becoming ill is x/N, and if this
event occurs the cost of treatment is the lowest of waiting costs (=θ T) and the cost of treatment in
the private sector (=p(t)=mq+t). Denoting total expected cost for a person of type θ  by B we thus
have





B θ + =    (6)
                                                
14 In spite of this argument, data from Norway indicate that for some types of treatment the price charged by private
hospitals is considerably lower than the costs in public hospitals. A further discussion of the costs of private and
public health services in Norway is given in Appendix E of Hoel and Sæther (2000).
15 As we shall soon see, a small change in taxes of the type “equal absolute change for all” does not contradict an
optimal design of the tax system, provided the initial tax system is optimally designed.10
Since both N and x are given, costs per person and costs per medical case are strictly
proportional. It is slightly more conveniently to work with the latter cost, which we denote
b(θ ,T,s) = BN/x. Inserting from (8) we thus have (using our normalization x=1):
[]
()
(,,) ( )( ) m i n , ( )
pt
bT tqq t y T p t
T
θθ =− + +    (7)
The objective of the government is to minimize the sum of costs for all persons. However, it is
not reasonable to assume that this sum is unweighted. If the government cares about equity, it is
reasonable to assume that low-income persons have a higher weight in the sum of costs than
high-income persons. In the hypothetical case of the government being perfectly informed about
everyone’s income earning abilities, lump-sum taxation could be used to obtain whatever
distributional objectives the government had. In this case everyone would have the same welfare
weight (on the margin) after the lump-sum taxation had been applied. In practice the government
does not have perfect information about individuals’ abilities. Distributional considerations must
therefore be achieved through distortionary taxation. In this case it is not optimal to redistribute
so much that marginal welfare weights are equalized across the population. The optimal design of
a distortionary tax system implies that redistribution has been taken to the point where the social
gain from further redistribution is exactly offset by the incremental distortion of higher rates of
taxation. Notice that for an optimally designed tax system of this type, social welfare cannot be
increased by increasing or reducing a tax component which is equal for all (and thus non-
distortionary) and adjusting the distortionary part of the tax system so that total revenue is
unchanged. On the margin, it thus makes no difference whether an increase in health
expenditures is financed by a non-distortionary tax increase i.e. a tax increase that is the same for
everyone (as assumed in (6)), or by an increase in distortionary tax rates.
We denote the welfare weights used in the social objective function by w(θ ). As argued
previously, a higher income typically will imply a higher willingness to pay to avoid waiting. We
therefore assume that the welfare weights w(θ ) are lower the higher is θ , i.e. w’(θ )<0 (with w’=0
as a limiting case). We also normalize the level of the welfare weights so that the average welfare
weight over the population is one, i.e.11
()() 1 wfd
β
α θθ θ = ∫ (8)
where f(θ ) is the density function for the distribution of θ  (i.e. f(θ ) ≡  F’(θ )). For the subsequent
analysis, it is convenient to introduce the notation
() ()() hw f θθ θ = (9)
and
() ( ) Hh i d i
θ
α θ = ∫ (10)
Notice that H(α )=0 and H(β )=1. Moreover, if w’(θ )<0 for all θ , then H(θ )>F(θ ) for α <θ <β .
16
The social objective function is given by
(,) ()()(,,) STt w f b Ttd
β
α θθ θ θ = ∫ (11)
where b(θ ,T,t) is given by (7). Using (8)-(10) we can rewrite this as
[] (,) () () ( )() STt T h d p h d q q ty
πβ
απ θθ θ θ θ π =+ + − + ∫∫ (12)
Since p=mq+t and π =p/T, S is given once T and t are given. The optimal waiting time and
tax/subsidy is the choice of (T,t) that minimizes (12).
                                                
16  Proof: assume H(γ )≤ F(γ ) for some γ∈ (α ,β ). Since H(β )=F(β )=1, this means that H’-F’=h-f=(w-1)f must be non-
negative for some θ >γ . But since w’<0 this in turn implies w(γ )>1. From (9) and (10) w’<0 implies H(γ )>w(γ )F(γ ).
Together with w(γ )>1 we thus have H(γ )>F(γ ), which contradicts our assumption H(γ )≤ F(γ ). We therefore must have
H(θ )>F(θ ) for all θ∈ (α ,β ).12
Before analyzing the optimal waiting time and tax/subsidy, it is useful to consider an obvious
third policy instrument in addition to waiting time and a tax/subsidy on private treatment. This
third alternative is to charge a price r for treatment in the public sector. With this alternative, each
individual will compare r+θ T with p when deciding whether to be treated by the public or by the
private sector. In the demand function (1), p/T is thus replaced by (p-r)/T. Moreover, in the
expression (5) for the cost covered by taxation we must replace q with q-r. With these changes, it
is straightforward to see that the total expected costs of the health system for a person of type θ  is
no longer given by (7), but by
[] (,,,) ( ) ( ( ) )( ) m i n ,
mq t r




=−− −+ + + + (13)
Introducing the notation τ =t-r, we can rewrite this as
[] (,,) ( )( ) m i n ,
mq
bT qq y T m q
T
τ
θτ τ θ τ
+
=− + + +    (14)
This is exactly the same as (7) except that t is replaced by τ . The social objective function S, and
the analysis of it, thus remains valid, when t is replaced by τ . Since t now is replaces by t-r, this
means that a subsidy to the private sector in our model is equivalent to a fee for treatment in the
public sector. From now on we ignore the possibility of a fee for public treatment, but simply
note that if a subsidy of private is optimal, we can achieve exactly the same by instead
introducing a fee for public treatment. Obviously, this equivalence would no longer hold if we
relaxed our assumption that total demand for health services was given independently of any
prices.
3. The optimal waiting time
In this Section we shall let p be given (e.g. equal to mq, which will be the case when there is no
tax or subsidy on private treatment). We return to the issue of a tax or subsidy in the next section.
Using (1) and (10), some manipulation of (12) yields13
[] (1 ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) Sqm q y p H F T I ππ π π =+ − − − + (15)
where
() () Ih d
π
α πθ θ θ = ∫ (16)
The term TI(π ) is equal to zero if either T is zero or π≤α , i.e. so small that everyone chooses
private treatment. Otherwise the term TI(π ) is positive.
It is useful to first consider the case in which everyone has the same welfare weight. In this case
the functions H and F are identical, so that the term H-F in (15) is zero. It is clear that in this case
the best we can do if m>1 is to choose T=0 (i.e. π =”∞ ”). This gives y=0 and S=q. If m=1 it
remains true that we cannot do better than choose T=0. In this case one could do equally well by
setting π≤α , i.e. T so high that y=1, giving B=q also in this case. This is equivalent to letting the
health treatment under consideration be fully privatized. We thus have the following proposition:
Proposition 1: For the case when everyone has equal welfare weights, it is never optimal to have
a positive waiting time for public health treatment.
From the discussion in the Introduction it is clear that “positive waiting time” means waiting time
beyond what is necessary for full capacity utilization.
Consider next the case with welfare weights that differ across types. Starting with the case of no
waiting time, we initially have TI(π )=0 and H=F. An increase in T (i.e. a reduction in π ) will as
before increase the term TI(π ). However, as some persons now choose private treatment, H-F
becomes positive. If the growth in p(H-F) is larger than the growth in TI(π ) (plus the growth in
(m-1)qy if m>1), the introduction of waiting time will reduce aggregate social costs S. In this
case it will therefore be optimal to have a positive waiting time for treatment in the public sector.14
In order for aggregate costs S to be lower with waiting time than without, it obviously must be
the case that the costs b(θ ,T,t) for some types must be lower with than without waiting time.
From (7) we know that b is increasing in θ , and that b=q for all types when T=0. If b(θ ,T,t)<q for
some positive value of T for some types, this inequality must certainly hold for the type with the
lowest waiting cost, i.e. for θ =α . Since waiting time for public treatment is only relevant if p>α T,
it follows from (7) that
()
(,, ) ( )( )
pt
bT tqq t y T
T
αα =− + + (17)
Inserting p/T=π  and p=mq+t gives us
(,, ) ()
qt




=− −  + 
(18)
Whether or not b<q for some value of T depends on the sign of the term in square brackets. If this
term is negative for all π  it must be true that b>q if there is waiting time. If on the other hand this
term is positive for some π , there will exist a positive waiting time giving b<q.
From this discussion, and remembering that m≥ 1 the following proposition follows:
Proposition 2: If π y(π )≤α  for all π , it is not optimal to have a positive waiting time for public
health treatment no matter what the welfare weights are.
Since with appropriately chosen welfare weights we can give as much weight to the type θ =α  as
we want, the following proposition must also hold:
Proposition 3:  If π y(π )>α  for some π  and m=1, it is optimal to have a positive waiting time for
public health treatment if the welfare function gives sufficiently high weights to the types with the
lowest waiting costs.15
Notice that if the tax rate t is chosen freely, the condition m=1 is not necessary for the result in
proposition 3. The reason is that even if m>1, the term (q+t)/(mq+t) can be set as close to 1 as
one wants by choosing a sufficiently high t. The choice of t and T for a given value of π  is
discussed in more detail in the next Section.
We conclude this Section with an example demonstrating the possibility of waiting time being
optimal. Let F(θ )=θ  (implying α =0 and β =1, and f(θ )=1)
17, and w(θ )=h(θ )=(1-σ )θ
-σ  where
0<σ <1, implying H(θ )=θ














1 () () HF
σ ππ π π
− −= − (20)
Inserting (19) and (20) into (15) and rearranging gives







−  =+ − + −−  −
(21)
It is easily verified that for 0<σ <1the term in square brackets is negative for some values of π
(smaller than 1). If e.g. m=1, this means that S is lower with waiting time than without.
4.  Waiting time and a tax or subsidy on private treatment
If the optimal waiting time is zero, everyone chooses public treatment, and the issue of a tax or
subsidy on private treatment is irrelevant. Similarly if the optimal outcome is to completely
privatize the health treatment under consideration. In the present model it makes no difference
whether or not the private treatment is subsidized in this case, as the costs in either case are
divided equally among everyone.
                                                
17 Notice that since α =0, the condition in Proposition 3 holds in this example.16
The interesting case to consider is the case in which it is optimal to have a waiting time that
makes some but not all persons choose private treatment. In the previous Section we saw that this
could be the case when individuals are given different welfare weights in the social objective
function.
To address the issue of a tax or subsidy on private treatment, it is useful to rewrite (15) as
()
( 1 ) () ( () () )
I




 =+ − + − −  
(22)
We showed in the previous Section that it is only if the term in square brackets is negative for
some π  that it is optimal to have waiting time in the public sector. In the opposite case the best we
can do is have T=0 (and y=0) or y=1.
Assume that the term in brackets is negative for some π , and that there exists a value of π∈ (α ,β )
that minimizes S for any given p. However, when we minimize S with respect to both T and t,
there is no solution to the minimization problem. To see this, consider an arbitrary value π * that
makes the square brackets in (22) negative. It then follows from (22) that for this value of π , S is
lower the higher is p. We thus have the following proposition:
Proposition 4: Assume that it is optimal to have waiting time for public treatment. Start with an
initial situation where the waiting time has a length implying lower social costs that the situation
with no waiting time. From this initial situation, increasing the waiting time and a tax on private
treatment simultaneously while keeping the ratio π =(mq+t)/T constant will always be welfare
improving.
The reason we get this somewhat surprising result is that the demand for private treatment in this
simple model remains unchanged as the price of this treatment increases, as long as π =p/T
remains constant. In reality, a large increase in the price of taxed private treatment would lead to17
a reduction in demand. One form of such a demand reduction would be substitution towards
untaxed private treatment, for instance treatment abroad.
5.  Capacity limit on public treatment
Till now, we have assumed that the amount of treatment in the public sector was determined
implicitly through the choice of waiting time in the public sector and the tax/subsidy of private
treatment. In this Section we shall briefly consider the case in which the capacity of the public
sector is given. We ignore the possibility of increasing this capacity through the direct purchase
of private capacity by the public health authorities, cf. the discussion in footnote 5.
A given capacity in the public sector less than total demand means that a given part of the
demand must be covered by the private sector. In our model this means that y is given by the
capacity limitation of the public sector. Since the demand for private treatment is given by y(π ),
this means that π  is given. The government’s decision problem is thus to choose T and t subject
to (mq+t)/T equal to the market clearing value of π . The government wants as before to make S
given by (22) as small as possible. Since y now is given, this simply means making the last term
in (22), i.e. the square brackets multiplied by p, as small as possible for the given value of π . The
solution to this problem is straightforward: If the square brackets are negative, S is lower the
higher t and T are for the given ratio (mq+t)/T. As mentioned in the end of the previous Section,
one cannot take this result to literally, due to limitations of the model.
If the square brackets in (22) are positive (as they will be for e.g. equal welfare weights, implying
H=F), the price p should be as small as possible. In practice this means that best the government
can do is to subsidize the private sector by so much that the price of private treatment is zero. The
waiting time in the public sector should also be set equal to zero. In this situation everyone is
indifferent between the two alternatives, and in equilibrium the number of people treated in the
public sector is equal to the capacity there.
As mentioned in Section 3, the discussion of T versus t applies also to whether or not one should
pay for public treatment. If the choice is between a fee for public treatment and rationing by
waiting time, our analysis shows that this depends on the sign of the square brackets in (22). If18
distributional considerations are ignored (or are small), this term will be positive. In this case it is
better to use a fee for public treatment than to ration the public treatment by waiting time.
However, if distributional considerations are sufficiently strong, the square brackets in (22) will
be negative. In this case the best policy is to provide public treatment free of charge, but with
waiting time for the treatment.
The discussion above may be summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 5: For a given value of π , implied by a given capacity limit on public treatment,
social costs will be lower the higher is the waiting time for public treatment and the tax on
private treatment, provided I(π )<π [H(π )-F(π )]. If I(π )>π [H(π )-F(π )] for the given value of π , the
optimal waiting time is zero, and the optimal tax/price policy is to have an equal price for public
and private treatment.
6.  The optimal tax/subsidy when waiting time is given.
In this section it is assumed that the waiting time is determined by mechanisms outside the
present analysis. We therefore consider waiting time as exogenous, and ask the question of what
the optimal tax or subsidy is in this case. The answer to this question will of course depend on
what the waiting time is. We assume that the waiting time is such that without any tax or subsidy,
some but not all persons will choose private treatment.
Without loss of generality we set T=1, so that π =p and (22) may be rewritten as
[] () ( 1 ) () () () () Sp q m q yp Ip pHp Fp =+ − + − − (23)
Since p=mq+t, choosing the optimal tax is equivalent to choosing the optimal price for private
treatment.
Differentiating (23) and using y=1-F, F’=f and H’=h gives, after some manipulation:19
[] '( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Sp qt fp H p F p =+ − − (24)
From the definition of the function H (see equations  (9)-(10)) we know that H(p)-F(p)
approaches zero as p approaches its upper limit β . Moreover, since we have assumed that without
a tax or subsidy y is positive, p can only be close to β  if t>0.  Since f(p)=F’(p)=-y’(p) it therefore
follows from ( 24) that
'( ) ( ) '( ) 0 Sp qt yp ≈− + > for p below, but  close to β  (25)
This inequality implies that if we start by considering a prohibitively high tax, making p=β , social
cost S can be reduced by reducing the tax rate. We therefore have the following proposition:
Proposition 6: It can never be optimal to have a tax rate that is so high that no one wants private
health care. Equivalently, it cannot be optimal to use legal regulation to prohibit private health
care.
The result above is valid no matter what one assumes about the welfare weights. For further
results, it is useful to distinguish between the cases where welfare weights are equal for all types,
and where the weights are declining in θ .
Consider first the case of equal welfare weights for everyone, implying H=F for all p. In this case
it follows from (24) that
'( ) ( ) '( ) Sp qt yp =− + if w(θ ) is independent of θ  (26)
It is clear from (26) that S’ is positive for t>-q and p∈ (α ,β ). Remembering that p=mq+t, the
following proposition therefore follows
Proposition 7: For the case when everyone has the same welfare weights, it is optimal to
subsidize private treatment. The optimal subsidy, denoted –t*, is given by –t*=min[α ,q].20
In other words, the optimal subsidy is at the most equal to q, but lower than q if a lower subsidy
is sufficient to induce everyone to choose private health care (implying p so low that y=x and
y’=0). Since we have assumed that mq>α  (i.e. some persons choose public treatment if there no
subsidy on private treatment), it is clear that –t*=α  if m=1.
Consider next the case of unequal welfare weights. In this case H(p)>F(p) for t=0. The sign of
S’(mq)  is therefore generally ambiguous. Moreover, as there is no reason to believe that S(p) is
convex, we would not know the sign of the optimal t even if we knew the sign of S’(mq). The
sign of the optimal t depends on S’ in the following way:
Remark 1: If S’(p) is positive (negative) for all p larger than (smaller than) or equal to mq, it is
optimal to  subsidize (tax)  private treatment.
It is useful to consider S’(p) in some more detail. Rewrite H-F as





























In words, σ  is the weighted average of the welfare weights of those who choose private
treatment. Since it is the types with high θ , i.e. low w(θ ), who choose private treatment, σ  must
be less than one. Notice that σ  depends on p, and thus on t.
Using (28), we can rewrite (24) as21
'( ) ( ) '( ) (1 ) Sp qt yp y σ =− + − − (29)
For y>0 (which is always optimal) it is useful to introduce the demand elasticity (measured
positively) for private treatment, denoted by ε (t):
() ' ( )
()
mq t







Using this elasticity, (29) can be rewritten as
() ( )
'( ) ( ) (1 ( ))





=− −  ++ 
(31)
Since m≥ 1, the following proposition follows immediately from Remark 1 and eq. (31):
 Proposition 8:  if ε (t)<1-σ (t) for all –q<t≤ 0, it is optimal to have a positive tax on private
treatment. For m=1 the “opposite” is also true: If ε (t)>1-σ (t) for all t≥ 0, it is optimal to
subsidize private treatment.
Also for the general case of unequal welfare weights it is possible for the corner solution with no
public treatment to be optimal:
Proposition 9: If S’(p) given by (31) is positive for all p∈ (α ,β ), the optimal solution is
characterized by p=α , i.e. the optimal subsidy is given by –t*=mq-α .
From (31) we also find the following condition for the optimal tax/subsidy when we have an
interior solution, i.e. mq+t*∈ (α ,β )):
Proposition 10: If it is optimal to have some public health care, the optimal value of t, denoted by
t*, is given implicitly by
(* ) 1 (* ) tt εσ =− for m=1 (32)
and by22
( 1 (* ) ) (* )
*










7.  Concluding remarks
Our analysis gives several important results regarding the optimal size of waiting time for public
health treatment (in particular, zero or positive) and of a tax/subsidy of private health treatment.
Several of the results depend strongly on the properties of the welfare weights in the social
welfare function. The properties of these welfare weights obviously depend on how strong the
concern for equity is. With no such concern the welfare weights will be the same for all, and for
this case we conclude that it is not optimal to have any waiting time for public treatment
(proposition 1 and 5). In this case everyone will choose public treatment if there is no capacity
limit on this treatment. If there is a capacity limit, one should subsidize private treatment and/or
have a fee on public treatment such that the consumer price of the two options is identical
(proposition 5). Similarly, if waiting time for public treatment is given exogenously by
mechanisms not included in our model, one should subsidize private treatment (proposition 7).
The more interesting case is the one where there is a concern for equity. In this case the welfare
weights will depend on the how strong this concern is. However, the properties of the welfare
weights will also depend on what the possibilities and efficiency costs are for redistributing
income through the tax system. In the hypothetical case where perfect lump-sum taxation is
feasible, equity concerns can be fully taken care of through the tax system. In this case welfare
weights in our analysis will be the same for everyone, and we get the same results as we found
for the case of no concern for equity. In the more realistic case where any redistributive taxes are
distortionary, the welfare weights will be given as a byproduct of the solution to the problem of
designing an optimal tax system. The higher are the distortionary costs of redistributing income
through the tax system, the more disperse will the equilibrium welfare weights in our analysis be.
If welfare weights are sufficiently disperse, it may be optimal to have a positive waiting time for
public treatment (proposition 3 and 5). In this case it is also optimal to have a positive tax on
private treatment (proposition 4 and 5). If waiting time is given exogenously, the sign of the23
optimal tax/subsidy is ambiguous for the case where welfare weights differ across types
(propositions 8-10).
In the discussion above, we have implicitly argued as if differences in types, measured by waiting
costs, are perfectly correlated with ability, and thus income, in the optimal tax problem. As
discussed in Section 2, we would expect the variation in waiting costs to be correlated to income
variations, but waiting costs are also likely to vary among individuals for other reasons. It is not
unlikely that “other reasons” are more important for health problems that prevent persons from
doing specific activities (work or leisure related) than health problems that to a larger extent
simply involve pain or discomfort that is more or less the same for everyone. If this is the case
the types θ  in our analysis will be less correlated with income in the former type of health
problem than in the latter. It therefore seems reasonable that the dispersion of the size of the
welfare weights should be less for the former type of treatment than for the latter. An implication
of this is that it can be rational to let policies regarding waiting time and taxes/subsidies to private
treatment differ between different types of health problems.24
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